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When Was Judicial Self-Restraint? 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
 This Essay responds to Judge Posner’s Jorde Symposium Essay 
The Rise and Fall of Judicial Restraint by analyzing the question of 
when, if ever, has judicial self-restraint thrived in the federal courts. 
Its central aim is to shed historicizing light on the trajectory of 
judicial activism by imaginatively rifling through an array of 
canonical and somewhat-less-than-canonical empirical identification 
strategies. Two conclusions follow from the inquiry. First, I find that 
the available data on the historical trajectory of judicial restraint are 
surprisingly poor, and it is necessary to offer any judgment about the 
historical path of judicial activism with great caution. Second, 
although the empirical record is fragmentary, some common points 
emerge from the use of divergent methodologies. Specifically, I 
suggest that the temporal domain of judicial activism should be 
expanded further back into American history than generally assumed. 
It was in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War that judicial 
behavior changed in a consequential way. That postbellum period 
has largely dropped out of the study of judicial activism, but should 
receive more attention than it currently does. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholarship abounds with unadorned juxtapositions of the terms 
“judicial activism” and “judicial self-restraint.” Yet, as Judge Richard Posner 
has long emphasized, that terminological antinomy is not self-explanatory. It is 
rather employed in two quite distinct senses to refer to two quite different 
underlying phenomena.1 First, the sibling terms are wielded in normative 
scholarship as a means of commenting on the appropriate role of a judiciary 
that exercises a constitutional negative in the context of a democratic polity. 
Second, the terms are also invoked in descriptive accounts of how judges 
behave when resolving potential conflicts between laws and the United States 
Constitution (e.g., to describe the rate of invalidation of state and federal 
statutes). Many academic treatments elide their discussions of the normative 
and the descriptive, or are reticent about where description ends and the 
normative begins. The catalyst for this Essay, Judge Posner’s Essay The Rise 
and Fall of Judicial Restraint, makes no such category error. It speaks first to 
the trajectory of normative scholarship through an intellectual history of 
Thayerian deference.2 It then addresses separately the descriptive question of 
how judicial behavior has changed over time through a lively dissection of how 
“Thayerian theory [works] . . . in the courts.”3 On neither front, Judge Posner 
concludes with manifest regret, does self-restraint thrive today. 
This Essay responds to Judge Posner’s insightful Essay by addressing in 
more detail some of the historical questions raised by descriptive usage of the 
judicial activism/restraint pairing. Specifically, I ask here when, if ever, judicial 
self-restraint thrived in the federal courts: If today is postlapsarian, when was 
the Eden of restraint? This descriptive question is not addressed extensively by 
Judge Posner’s Essay. Yet his interrogation of Thayer’s influence, his spirited 
defense of pragmatic adjudication, and his empirical exploration of activism on 
the contemporary bench fairly implicate the historical question of just when 
self-restraint was in the ascendant. By extending the study of judicial activism 
back before the opening of the twentieth century, moreover, Judge Posner has 
flagged the important related question of how contemporary debates about 
1. The distinction is drawn in Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A 
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 32–34 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Foreword]. 
2. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 
(2012) [hereinafter Posner, Rise and Fall]. By “Thayerian deference” I mean the theory associated 
with James Bradley Thayer that federal courts “can only disregard [an] Act when those who have the 
right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one.” James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 
144 (1983). 
3. See, e.g., Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 546. 
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“judicial activism” should be situated in a larger historical account of American 
judicial and political development. 
Following Judge Posner, I define judicial activism for present purposes to 
measure the frequency with which courts declare “legislative or executive 
action unconstitutional.”4 I therefore focus here on a relatively narrow species 
of judicial behavior of particular concern in a political system that is otherwise 
facially committed to democratic norms. My central aim is to shed some 
historicizing light on the trajectory of judicial activism so defined by 
imaginatively rifling through an array of canonical and somewhat-less-than-
canonical empirical identification strategies.5 I draw two conclusions, which, to 
my embarrassment, are partly at war with each other. 
First, I suggest that the available data on the historical trajectory of 
judicial activism/restraint are surprisingly poor. Notwithstanding some recent 
empirical analyses,6 current understandings of the federal judiciary’s historical 
movement along a judicial self-restraint/activism spectrum, and in particular 
the question of when any historical era of restraint ended, remain inadequately 
explored. Many of the recent and canonical studies have serious 
methodological and conceptual problems.7 Alternative and novel means of 
investigating the historical question have not been exploited. As a result, our 
inarticulate but shared intuitions about the historical trajectory of judicial 
activism may rest on unrepresentative anecdotes and incomplete data. At the 
very least, it seems most appropriate now to offer judgments about the 
historical path of judicial activism with great caution and in the expectation of 
4. Id. at 521. For a slightly different definition, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 
287 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK] (defining the activism/restraint spectrum 
according to whether a decision “expands the Court’s authority relative to that of the other branches of 
government”). This is not the only sensible way in which the term judicial activism could be 
operationalized. For an alternative definition of activism that leverages the differences between legal 
standards of review, see Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 19–22 (2011). One might alternatively 
reject entirely the utility of the term. For example, one of Judge Posner’s colleagues on the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Easterbrook, has argued for the term’s “abolition” because of its 
analytic vacuity and its routine deployment as a mere label of normative or political opprobrium. Frank 
Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV 1401, 
1402 (2002). I agree with Judge Easterbrook’s evaluation of how the term is used in current political 
discourse. Moreover, I do not mean to suggest that any simple political lessons can be drawn from the 
historicizing enterprise here. To the contrary, a richer understanding of historical trends ought to 
puncture the cavalier certainties of contemporary activism’s critics by showing how varied “activism” 
has been. I labor under no illusion, however, of landing a fatal blow on the rhetoric of activism here, 
alas. 
5. My strategy here is therefore distinct from the more historical and impressionistic approach 
taken in BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (chronicling public 
attitudes toward the Supreme Court throughout American history).  
6. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009). 
7. See infra Part I.B. 
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further historical and empirical work that sweeps away today’s pieties. I hope 
the conclusions in this Essay are taken in that humble and corrigible spirit. 
Second, although the empirical record is fragmentary, some noteworthy 
commonalities emerge from the divergent methodologies. In the second Part of 
the Essay, I bring out those commonalities as a way of prompting 
reconsideration of currently shared assumptions about the “when” of judicial 
activism. Specifically, I intimate that the temporal domain of activism should 
be expanded further back into American history than is generally assumed. To 
see why, consider one piece of folk wisdom among lawyers and legal scholars 
that is recapitulated in The Rise and Fall of Judicial Restraint: the “judicial 
demise of the Thayerian theory [i.e., self-restraint on the bench] . . . is 
attributable to the exuberant activism of the Warren Court . . . .”8 In other 
words, our current age of rampant, even lurid, activism on the bench is sharply 
separated from a longer period of more democratic, more modest, and more 
appropriate judicial behavior. According to the conventional wisdom, the 
continuity-breaking spike of activism arrived during the Warren Court, which 
lasted from 1953 to 1969.9 
In what follows, I argue that although the partial and fragmentary data 
assembled here do suggest that the Warren Court was one of the discontinuities 
in the Supreme Court’s behavior, the data also suggest that the Warren Court 
was neither the origin of activism nor the terminus of restraint. I hope this is 
not really news. It has long been known that well before the Warren Court, 
during the so-called Lochner era of the 1890s through to the 1930s, federal 
courts also fairly frequently invalidated both state and federal laws on 
constitutional grounds that have since been repudiated.10 These earlier 
decisions were so contentious that President Franklin Roosevelt famously 
proposed a controversial court-packing plan to change the outcomes of 
Supreme Court review.11 So the idea that judicial activism might predate Earl 
Warren should hardly be startling. 
 8. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 546.  
 9. The conventional arc is rehearsed in the first and last chapter headings of Lucas Powe’s 
recent history of the Court—“Very Modest Beginnings” and “An Imperial Court.” LUCAS A. POWE, 
JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008, at 1, 312 (2009).  
10. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York law that regulated 
bakers’ working conditions); see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 
(1987) (“The received wisdom is that Lochner was wrong because it involved ‘judicial activism’: an 
illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of 
government.”). Lochner is a synecdoche for a line of cases in which the federal courts of the 
Progressive Era invalidated redistributive economic legislation. In another account of judicial activism, 
Thomas Keck traces it back to 1937 and the end of the Lochner line of cases. See THOMAS M. KECK, 
THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD OF MODERN JUDICIAL 
CONSERVATIVISM 17–19 (2004). 
11. See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 
291–306 (2010) (describing President Roosevelt’s announcement of the plan and the hostile public 
response). 
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Yet the Lochner era, no less than the Warren Court era, was not the 
opening salvo of judicial activism in American history. Rather, the data 
collated here point instead to the immediate aftermath of the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction period—some two to three decades prior to the Lochner era—as 
the pivotal moment at which judicial behavior changed in a consequential way. 
Simply put, before the Civil War, few state or federal statutes were invalidated 
by federal courts for constitutional reasons. After the Civil War, the pace of 
overt invalidations on constitutional grounds picked up dramatically. The 
fundamentally upward trajectory in the rate of activist decisions then continued, 
with only temporary setbacks, up through at least the end of the Rehnquist 
Court in 2005. Those seeking a culprit for the “fall” of judicial self-restraint are 
therefore well advised to look to the little-studied postbellum Court of the 
1860s and 1870s, rather than the Warren Court or the Lochner era. Even others 
less intent on fixing blame for our current activist predicament should consider 
anew the legacy of that historical period, which has largely and unfortunately 
dropped out of the study of American constitutional law. 
I. 
GAUGING THE “WHEN” OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
It is increasingly common ground among historians that judicial review is 
older than Marbury.12 Even before the Constitution’s 1788 ratification, colonial 
judges acted upon a felt “duty to decide in accord with the law of the land,” 
including the Constitution.13 The new Supreme Court—the only federal 
tribunal mandated by Article III—began to inch toward a muscular stance on 
judicial review almost immediately under its second Chief Justice, Oliver 
Ellsworth.14 But when did that juridical possibility of statutory invalidation 
become quotidian judicial practice? At what moment in the history of the 
American federal courts was a quondam norm of restraint (if there ever was 
one) abandoned? 
Many studies of judicial activism and self-restraint concentrate on only 
recent history in an effort to evaluate sitting and recent Justices going back to 
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (marking the beginning of 
constitutional invalidation). The best account of the pre-Marbury roots of judicial review is PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 406–61 (2010) (collecting cases from New Jersey, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and North Carolina). For another account that also traces judicial review 
back in time beyond the Revolution to “a longstanding English corporate practice under which a 
corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England,” see Mary Sarah 
Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504 (2006). 
13. HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 17. 
14. Prior to Marbury, the Ellsworth Court signaled its willingness to rule on the constitutional 
validity of federal law. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (upholding federal tax 
on carriages). The Court even invalidated as-applied some parts of a federal enactment. See Mossman 
v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (holding that section 11 of the 1789 Judiciary Act could not be 
constitutionally read to extend to suits between two aliens).  
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the New Deal.15 In part this focus is motivated by the simple fact that better 
data exist for more recent periods of judicial activity than for some older 
periods in time. By pushing back the inquiry to the late 1800s, Judge Posner 
raises the stakes and introduces larger historical questions: How has use of the 
judicial power to invalidate the legislated products of democratic assemblies 
been exercised since Congress first fashioned federal courts in 1789? Has 
judicial activism steadily waxed, even as judicial self-restraint has waned? Is 
there, in fact, a discernible rise, followed by a fall, in the quantity of judicial 
restraint, as Judge Posner’s lecture title suggests? Indeed, is the path of judicial 
activism even linear, or is the history of judicial restraint in federal courts better 
characterized as cyclical?16 
Answers to these interconnected inquiries are surprisingly elusive. There 
is no clearly dispositive empirical study of judicial activism, and, as I shall 
explain below, the one available semi-official source has recently been 
vigorously challenged by political scientists.17 The existing data rest on 
controversial and incompletely theorized assumptions. Potentially promising 
lines of empirical inquiry have gone unexplored. To collate what is known, this 
Part works through four ways in which the question “when was judicial self-
restraint?” might be approached. The first two are straightforward, and one can 
be described as almost canonical. But both leave many important empirical and 
conceptual questions unresolved. The shortfalls of standard inquiries imply 
there is more work to be done. I therefore offer two unorthodox takes on 
(something like) activism’s historical pathway. These perspectives are offered 
in an adventurous spirit. Even if they are ultimately analytic dead ends, I hope 
they provoke new questions about our shared history quite beyond the support 
they provide to the larger conclusions drawn in the following Section. 
A. Indications of Postbellum Judicial Activism  
Consider first the semiofficial approach to counting the frequency of 
federal and state law invalidations. The Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress (LOC) maintains the “canonical catalog[] of cases” in 
which the Supreme Court has invalidated a federal or state law.18 The LOC 
15. See, e.g., STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
49–52, 70–74 (2009) (separately addressing federal and state law invalidations). Much of Cross and 
Lindquist’s work addresses the separate and separately important question of intrabench comparisons 
between Justices. See id. at 136; see also Yung, supra note 4, at 2 (looking at sitting courts of appeals 
judges). 
16. See EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA, at ix (2011) (“In the last 100 or so 
years, the nation has oscillated between its commitment to judicial vindication of vested rights and its 
commitment to government by the people.”). Perhaps oddly, Lee claims to have identified “origins of 
judicial restraint doctrine in the Supreme Court” in his narrative survey of only a century of law. Id. at 
195. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 24 to 28. 
18. Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1257, 1261–62 (2009) [hereinafter Whittington, Judicial Review Before the Civil War]. I call the 
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maintains separate lists of federal laws and state or municipal laws invalidated 
by the Court, and also a stand-alone list of state laws held preempted by federal 
laws.19 The latter, however, includes some cases in which the Court ousted a 
state law not merely based on a conflict with a federal law but also with a 
provision of the federal Constitution other than the Supremacy Clause. The 
LOC lists are current up to 2002. 
The LOC does not provide an explanation for how it has coded cases.20 
This makes conclusive interpretation of its data difficult. Nevertheless, the 
LOC lists provide at least a starting point for historical inquiry into judicial 
activism. It is possible to use them to identify the basic trajectory of judicial 
activism across time. Figure 1 illustrates the results of a manual count of all 
cases listed by the LOC as constitutional invalidations of a state or federal 
enactment between 1800 and 2000. I also have included in this count all of the 
preemption cases listed by the LOC in which the Court did not simply cite a 
federal statute or the Supremacy Clause but also cited a separate and distinct 
constitutional provision as a basis for its ruling.21 Figure 1 solely summarizes 
the LOC data; it reflects no judgment on my part about the LOC’s selection 
criteria or other methodological questions.22 
LOC’s approach “semi-official” because, while a governmental body that is generally held in high 
esteem produces it, it has no formal or juridical status. It is not, that is, the federal government’s 
standardized measure of judicial activism.  
19. See Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. DOC. NO. 108-17, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 2117 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf; State Constitutional and Statutory 
Provisions and Municipal Ordinances Held Unconstitutional or Held to Be Preempted by Federal 
Law 1789–2002, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra, at 2161, available at http://origin.www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-11.pdf; see also LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, & DEVELOPMENTS 176–207 (4th ed. 2006) 
(reporting federal and state laws invalidated by the Supreme Court between 1789 and 2005 based on 
data from the Congressional Research Service).  
20. Coding concerns the protocols used by the compiler of the list for determining when to 
include and when not to include an item on the list. On the importance of rigorous coding, see R.M. 
LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 166–83 (2010).  
21. The distinction between preemption cases and constitutional cases may strike some as 
artificial. After all, a preemption holding necessarily entails an application of the Supremacy Clause. 
But most preemption cases do not involve the unmediated application of judicial doctrine directly 
inferred from the Constitution and applied to a state statute—a federal law plays an intermediating 
role. Arguably, where Congress by enactment of a statute with preemptive effect has displaced a state 
law, the court enforcing that federal rule does not engage in “judicial activism” in any simple way 
because it has an imprimatur of congressional support. Of course, this account is too simple. It elides, 
for example, the possibility of judicial discretion as to the metes and bounds of preemptive effects. I do 
not control for that possibility here because of uncertainty as to the appropriate measure of judicial 
fidelity to congressional goals in the application of preemptive statutes.  
22. The first step in the construction of Figure 1 was a manual count of cases listed by the 
LOC as involving the invalidation of a law, and an assignment of those cases to a decade 
according to the date reported in the U.S. Reporter. Examination of the LOC’s preemption list, 
however, revealed cases in which the Court relied on constitutional grounds as well as statutory 
reasons. In any case listed that raised such a doubt, the text of the case was read, therefore, and 
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At first glance, the LOC data tell a familiar story. As Judge Posner 
explains, there is a sharp change at the beginning of the Warren Court.23 There 
is also a peak of judicial activity once Chief Justice Warren leaves the bench in 
1969. It is followed, in the Rehnquist years, by a decline in the number of state 
and local laws being invalidated. In this more recent period, by contrast, 
invalidation rates have remained steady. Moreover, looking now at the decades 
immediately before the Warren Court, the beginning and end of the Lochner 
era are clearly discernible in the data. 
All this is familiar fare. The surprising part of the story turns on what 
comes before the Lochner era. It is not the case that the Lochner era marks the 
cases in which there was a separate constitutional ruling were added to the count of instances in 
which a state law was invalidated. 
23. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 548. For one snapshot of that mid-twentieth century 
change, focusing on individual-rights cases alone, see Geoffrey R. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of 
Aggressive Majoritarianism: A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15, 16–17 (1984) (focusing on the 
changing percentage of cases in which the Court rejected cases). Stone’s analysis is incomplete insofar 
as it does not address the possibility that the Court’s changing rate of rejection of individual-rights 
cases may be due to changes in the composition of the pool of cases before the Court (e.g., the Court’s 
earlier activism has attracted outlier claims that the Court rejects).  
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beginning of activism’s ascent. The turning point in judicial behavior seems to 
come not as economic due process is on the rise in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, but two decades earlier. The LOC’s measure of judicial activism, which 
has been basically flat since the Republic’s founding, suddenly takes off after 
the Civil War and during Reconstruction. Moreover, while the Warren Court 
can plausibly be described as a turning point, it can equally be read as simply a 
renewal of the trend line that began after the Civil War and that was merely 
temporarily suppressed after the death of economic due process. Self-restraint, 
on this view, died not in Little Rock, but sometime in the wake of Appomattox. 
Notwithstanding the LOC’s canonical status—or perhaps because of it—
the federal data compilation has attracted strong criticism. It has recently been 
argued that the LOC data misses relevant antebellum judicial activity because 
its editors chose not to include as-applied invalidations of federal statutes or 
cases in which the Court simply declined to apply federal law on constitutional 
grounds.24 This omission results, some argue, in a significant undercount of 
judicial activism prior to the Civil War.25 
To remedy this alleged defect, two political scientists, Tom S. Clark and 
Keith Whittington, have put together a challenger empirical study to the LOC 
data that is available online but has not been finalized in published form at the 
time of this writing.26 Rejecting the LOC list as “significantly underinclusive,” 
Clark and Whittington offer their own list of 1260 cases in which the Supreme 
Court has either upheld or invalidated a federal statute on either as-applied or 
facial grounds.27 Like the LOC data, the version of the Clark-Whittington 
paper that was available online at the time of this writing does not contain a 
coding protocol that allows the study to be duplicated.28 This is, to be sure, a 
lacuna that the authors may well address in later versions of the paper (and I do 
not mean to suggest otherwise). Further, even though there are reasons for 
looking at the effect of judicial review on both state and federal laws,29 Clark 
and Whittington look only at cases involving federal statutes, although they 
usefully include in their count cases in which the Court upheld a federal law. 
24. Whittington, Judicial Review Before the Civil War, supra note 18, at 1262. 
25. Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority, 82 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 177, 181 (2007) (counting twenty pre-Civil War cases in which the Court imposed 
constitutional limits on congressional power). Graber argues that the antebellum Court was inclined to 
enforce constitutional norms in this indirect way, and that scholars have failed to notice this effect. Id. 
26. Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts 
of Congress, 1789–2006 (Working Paper, May 22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1475660. 
27. Id. at 7. 
28. For an introduction to the importance of creating replicable protocol, see LAWLESS ET AL., 
supra note 20, at 166–69. The Clark-Whittington paper contains a narrative description of the coding 
protocol that would be difficult or impossible to replicate. Clark & Whittington, supra note 26. 
29. See Frank B. Cross & Stephanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1770–73 (2007) (considering whether to include invalidations of state statutes 
and concluding there is no persuasive reason not to). 
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The omission of federal judicial considerations of state rules raises questions 
about the validity of their results as comprehensive accountings of the federal 
bench’s activism. 
Putting aside these caveats there is one observation about the Clark-
Whittington data worth stressing here. The trend line visible in the Clark-
Whittington data (which I do not reproduce here30) has striking similarities to 
the LOC trend line.31 Of particular relevance to the argument to be developed 
in Part II, the Clark-Whittington data, just like the LOC data, suggest that the 
notable change in judicial behavior came around the post-Civil War and 
Reconstruction period rather than later in the nineteenth century. 
Other nonquantitative studies of nineteenth-century judicial behavior 
point in a similar direction. Mark Graber has found nearly two dozen 
antebellum cases limiting federal power on constitutional grounds, but still 
concludes that there was no “judicial tradition, activist or restrained . . . at the 
time when Dred Scott was decided [in 1857].”32 Rather, the case broke new 
ground, Graber argues, by employing for the first time language of 
constitutional invalidity in reference to a federal statute.33 Howard Gillman has 
emphasized the institutional transformation of the federal courts in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. From an “understaffed and unpaid” judicial 
infrastructure headed by justices perennially distracted by the travails of riding 
circuit, the federal courts had “become by century’s end a real third branch of 
government.”34 Further, Gillman emphasizes, new legislation expanding 
removal authority and adding federal question jurisdiction dramatically 
increased the reach and workload of the federal bench.35 In short, 
nonquantitative and historical studies isolate a shift in both federal judicial 
behavior and capacities around the end of the Civil War and the beginning of 
Reconstruction—that is, the very moment at which the LOC and Clark-
Whittington data suggest was pivotal in the development of judicial activism. 
B. Limitations in the Data 
Yet both the LOC and the Clark-Whittington data have serious conceptual 
problems. Proceeding further without setting out those problems would be 
irresponsible. This Section therefore identifies five limitations to the data so far 
canvassed. To be clear, these problems imply there is some distance to go 
before our understanding of historical patterns of judicial activism can be taken 
30. Because the Clark-Whittington paper is a draft, it seems inappropriate and presumptuous to 
reproduce their preliminary results here. Readers are, of course, encouraged to review the paper 
directly.  
31. See Clark & Whittington, supra note 26, at 11 (showing trends from 1789–2006). 
32. Graber, supra note 25, at 180. 
33. Id. at 181. 
34. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002). 
35. Id. at 515–17, 520. 
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as robust. Nevertheless, as developed in Part II, I believe at least some 
inferences can be drawn from the LOC and Clark-Whittington data along with 
other sources, particularly where divergent methods yield similar conclusions. 
The five concerns grouped here, though, should be taken as threshold reasons 
for caution about the empirical foundations of the arguments to be developed in 
Part II as well as issues to be addressed in future research. 
First, the LOC and the Clark-Whittington data do not trace precisely the 
same trajectory. The LOC data evinces less volatility than the Clark-
Whittington data. This difference hints at consequential disputes about how 
best to count cases of judicial invalidation. For instance, in 1800, the Supreme 
Court held that a suit between two aliens could not proceed under section 11 of 
the 1789 Judiciary Act, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, 
because such suits were not allowed under Article III of the Constitution.36 
Does that count as the “invalidation” of a statute or is it an act of “narrowing” 
by statutory interpretation?37 Reasonable people can disagree. There is today a 
wide array of statutory interpretation tools that allow judges to apply 
constitutional norms short of making an explicit finding of invalidity.38 It has 
long been clear, for example, that the constitutional avoidance canon has both 
full-throated and more modest formulations.39 What lawyers or judges count as 
“invalidation” on constitutional terms will be endogenous to evolving 
conceptions of judicial craft. Reasonable people circa 1800 may therefore 
disagree about the proper categorization of a particular case to a different 
degree and on different terms from reasonable people in 2012. For example, 
decisions shaving off the most significant applications of a statute for 
constitutionally inspired reasons, but leaving the statute standing, might be seen 
as a more telling show of judicial power than other decisions explicitly resting 
on constitutional turf.40 For these reasons, it may not always be clear where the 
line between statutory interpretation and constitutional judgment should lie 
36. Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800). 
37. Narrowing, of course, can be as objectionable as invalidation from Congress’s perspective. 
See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 95 (“[T]he supposed difference 
between a constitutionally inspired rewriting and an invalidation turns out to be illusory.”).  
38. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 
(1979)) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
39. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) 
(distinguishing modern from classical avoidance). 
40. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 37, at 95. Moreover, the Court can affirm a government 
action and in so doing suggest or confirm the breadth of judicial power. This was a tactic used seriatim 
by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy 
and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221, 224 (1998) (explaining how Marshall would 
“preserve judicial power by asserting its existence, thus establishing precedents for future use, while 
not actually attempting to challenge executive or legislative authority in any controversial way”). It is 
hard to imagine a simple quantitative methodology that would pick out such cases.  
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even absent the operation of the avoidance canon. Even if it was clear how to 
draw this line, it is not obvious how that line could be applied to the diverse 
range of judicial texts produced over the centuries to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
Second, neither the LOC nor the Clark-Whittington list addresses the 
judicial treatment of executive actions.41 It is common knowledge that as a 
result of the post-New Deal regulatory state, judges interact as much or more 
with the products of agency deliberation as statutes. Should not the effect of 
federal judges’ constitutional views upon agency rulings and actions also count 
in a tally of “judicial activism,” especially at a time when the executive is often 
recognized as an almost coequal democratic policy maker with Congress? To 
take this step raises further questions of enumeration and method. Scholars still 
diverge on how constitutionally grounded canons of interpretation should 
interact with the otherwise applicable rule of deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes.42 Against that background disagreement, it would be 
necessary to develop a way of defining when judicial review of agency action 
becomes sufficiently constitutional in tenor to measure activism in this domain. 
It would also be necessary to develop a means to apply that distinction to cases 
on the ground. 
Third, both the LOC and Clark-Whittington data have a missing 
denominator problem. If the frequency of judicial invalidations moves over 
time, such a change may indicate that judges’ attitudes and behavior are 
springing and shifting over time. Or it may not. Changes in the rate of judicial 
invalidation may also reflect changes in the background volume of state and 
federal laws (and perhaps regulations) over time. As the statute books engorge, 
the task of judicial review grows correspondingly more onerous. Even keeping 
the size of the statute books constant, the volume of invalidation may still rise 
if Congress and state legislatures enact more unconstitutional statutes (or the 
executive begins to enforce more previously quiescent unconstitutional 
enactments). This might be so if the early Republic’s Congresses more 
carefully considered constitutional questions than their contemporary Beltway 
successors.43 These two trends—relating to the volume of legislation and the 
proportion of legislation that is constitutional—may provide an alternative, 
nonjudicial explanation for changes in the data. Neither can be rejected merely 
based on a review of the LOC or the Clark-Whittington data. 
41. See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 15, at 94–99 (examining this question at the level of 
individual Justices). 
42. See Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 
347 (2007) (noting uncertainty). For a recent proposal counseling case-by-case analysis, see Kenneth 
A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 
68 (2008). 
43. For an account of the early Congress that lends credence to this thesis, see DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801 (1997).  
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The question of what variables should be used to generate a measure of 
changing judicial behavior, in short, remains to be answered. The complexity of 
the question—not to mention the manner in which it implicates highly 
contested, normative judgments about the domain of constitutional values—
may counsel for skepticism about any real judgment about activism beyond the 
crude “head count” approach I employ here.44 At the very least, it suggests the 
need to take inferences from any single data source with a grain of salt. 
Fourth, both the LOC and the Clark-Whittington data are partial and so 
potentially misrepresentative because they concern only the Supreme Court. 
That tribunal is merely the tip of the American judicial infrastructure. The 
activities of lower federal courts and state courts are also relevant to any 
accounting of judicial activism for two reasons. First, they may supplement 
Supreme Court action by invalidating important enactments even in the absence 
of substantive higher court review.45 Second, lower federal courts and state 
tribunals may drag their heels when operationalizing Supreme Court directives, 
mitigating their practical effect. This would result in underenforcement of a 
constitutional norm and the continued survival of some at least notionally 
unconstitutional state or federal statutes or practices. The Supreme Court has 
limited capacity to mitigate this sort of agency slack. As Judge Posner has 
observed, the Court “can no longer control the lower courts by means of narrow 
case-by-case determinations [and] must perforce act legislatively.”46 It is 
therefore unsafe to assume that a high court instruction will be carried out 
faithfully by the diverse membership of state and lower federal judiciaries.47 
Finally, judicial invalidations may differ in their size. A Court that 
invalidates a dozen trivial pensions and benefits provisions per year can 
plausibly be described as less “activist” than a court that invalidates one major 
federal statute annually. Not every case is Brown v. Board of Education.48 And, 
indeed, even the standalone effect of Brown, independent of the larger civil 
rights movement, has been subject to debate.49 There is thus both variance in 
and disagreement about the effect of decisions on the ground. Neither the LOC 
nor the Clark-Whittington data account in any fashion for the magnitude of a 
decision.50 The Clark-Whittington decision to omit state law invalidations 
44. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 1410 (expressing doubt that “an objecitve definition of 
activism . . . [can] capture much of value”). 
45. E.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (invalidating 
Indianapolis pornography statute), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
46. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 269. 
47. The problem is acute even in the federal judiciary because of the absence of coordination 
on method. See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the 
Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 559 (2005). 
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
49. See generally, e.g., GERALD D. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (presenting empirical evidence of weak effect of the Warren Court’s 
desegregation decisions). 
50. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 29, at 1772–73 (noting the magnitude-of-decision 
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further obscures matters. One might think a historical account of judicial 
review omitting Brown is somewhat incomplete. The footprint of decisions 
may also interact with the timing of a decision. It is plausible to posit that early 
judicial interventions, because they serve as dispositive precedent for longer 
periods of time, are systematically more important in setting the terms of 
institutional and doctrinal development than later cases.51 On this logic, the size 
of a judicial decision should also include a discount rate for its dwindling 
temporal proximity to the foundational moments of American history. 
Even setting aside problems of verification and replication caused by the 
absence of coding information, the LOC and Clark-Whittington data provide 
mere snapshots of the whole. And they tell us nothing about when and how 
judicial activism has mattered to the democratic public, let alone to those 
segments of the public (such as women and African Americans) who were 
historically locked out of the polity and who might be expected to look with 
special fervor to the courts, rather than the political branches, for policy 
change. Yet such public sentiments may be salient to an evaluation of how 
countermajoritarian the exercise of judicial review in fact is. Both the LOC and 
Clark-Whittington data await amplification and clarification both by 
empirically and theoretically inclined scholars who will resolve the underlying 
conceptual issues and also the nettlesome problem of operationalizing those 
concepts in a way that enables “clear and detailed definitio[n]” of judicial 
activism.52 
These five analytic and conceptual shortfalls in the canonical data together 
suggest that we are presently some ways from an accurate estimate of the 
historical path of judicial activism across American history (if such a count is 
even possible). The denominator problem (number three) seems particularly 
hard to me. Any inferences from this data—of the kind essayed below—must 
therefore be sensitive to the absence of information about the magnitude of 
decisions’ effects (numbers three and five), cautious about the effect of the 
regulatory state (number two), and attuned to volatility caused by counting 
errors (numbers one and four). Such inferences will perforce be modest, 
touching on only large themes, and not details, in the history of federal judicial 
review. 
C. Suggestions to Clarify the Historical Role of Judicial Activism  
The limitations of the standard data should have already sparked a rush to 
find new ways of relating the history of judicial activism. Indeed, it is 
remarkable and perhaps even embarrassing that the central practice of 
problem in a general sense). 
51. As an example of path-dependency-inducing jurisprudence, consider McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
52. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 20, at 173 (“[R]egardless of the type of variable at issue, it 
is important that the researcher specify clear and detailed definitions of each variable . . . .”). 
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constitutional law—the judicial act of invalidating laws based on their 
inconsistency with the Constitution—is so shrouded in empirical doubt. In that 
spirit, I briefly offer here two speculative suggestions about how the historical 
role of judicial activism might be clarified further. Neither completely answers 
the five critiques summarized above, but then neither is intended to do so. Both 
instead do provide some comfort for the project of making general inferences 
about the historical trajectory of judicial activism. 
The first approach examines the temporal space between 
ratification/enactment of constitutional text and judicial review, building on 
work by Professor Adam Samaha. This approach queries how the introduction 
of new constitutional provisions affects the activism of the Court by providing 
new textual bases with which to invalidate statutes. Samaha noticed there is 
often a lag between the time a constitutional amendment is ratified and the time 
the Court first interprets the resulting new text.53 This gap between ratification 
and what we might call “first contact” averages forty years.54 
A collateral benefit of using Samaha’s data on the time lag between 
ratification and judicial interpretation of constitutional amendments is that 
doing so allows for the construction of a historical distribution of “first contact” 
points between the Court and constitutional text. This is arguably another 
snapshot into the timing of textual and doctrinal innovation by the Court, albeit 
a highly partial one.55 That is, the Samaha data tracks when the Court has 
turned to new constitutional text as grounds for considering (although not 
necessarily invalidating) laws on the basis of an individual right (although not 
on the basis of the original seven Articles).56 It shows the distribution of a 
particular (and surely quite limited) element of what might be termed judicial 
activism by charting when the Court has expanded the textual foundation upon 
which federal or state laws may be invalidated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53. Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1297 
(2008).  
54. Id. at 1310. Professor Samaha distinguishes interpretations from mere citations. Id. at 1365. 
He also reports that his definition of an “interpretation” is “liberal[].” Id. at 1310. 
55. Id. at 1365. Alternatively, the Samaha data might measure a sort of judicial conservatism—
the reliance on text rather than free-form reasoning to reach conclusions.  
56. Id. at 1309.  
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Notice, again, the sharp rise in the number of “first contact” points after 
the Civil War. There are easily discernible historical reasons for this spike in 
the data, most of which center on the Court’s encounters with Reconstruction 
Amendments it could not have addressed previously. But however we explain 
that peak, the data lend more confidence to the inference developed in Part II: 
something happened to judicial behavior in the post-Civil War and 
Reconstruction period. For if three measures as distinct and different as the 
LOC data, the Clark-Whittington data, and the Samaha data each converge on 
that period in time as significant, this may be more than mere coincidence. 
The second approach to the “when” of judicial activism is even more 
unorthodox. It does not even measure judicial behavior. Rather than ask what 
courts do, it asks when judicial activism comes to be a subject of public 
concern. That is, one can try to estimate changing public perceptions of the 
Court’s behavior so as to draw a judgment about when members of the public 
started to categorize the actions of courts as activist. Public perceptions of 
activism are surely a highly imperfect proxy for judicial behavior. Although it 
is not implausible to think that changes in judicial behavior might lead to shifts 
in public opinion, it is also possible to imagine a diversity of exogenous causes 
of such shifts, ranging from changing economic conditions to the publicity 
efforts of ambitious elected officials, legislators, and candidates.57 
57. As indeed appears to be the case in the 2012 presidential campaign. See Adam Liptak & 
Michael D. Shear, Republicans Turn Judicial Power into a Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,  
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/us/politics/republicans-turn-judicial-power-into-a-
campaign-issue.html. 
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One way to gauge the shift in public perceptions of judicial activism over 
time is to examine published works that address judicial actions. Google has 
now digitized 12 percent of all books (but, alas, not periodicals).58 In recent 
years, Google has enabled searches for the usage of an “n-gram,” a string of 
letters separated by a given number of spaces, across time in the corpus.59 
Using this search provides a glimpse less into the ebb and flow of daily 
discourse and more into patterns of sustained changes in general and scholarly 
debate. Two n-grams for “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint” are 
reproduced below. 
 
FIGURE 3: Google n-grams for “judicial activism” and  
“judicial restraint” 
a. n-gram for “judicial activism” (American English, 1800–2000, 
smoothing = 3) 
 
b. n-gram for “judicial restraint” (American English, 1800–2000, 
smoothing = 3) 
58. See Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Qualitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized 
       
596 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:579 
 
Even as a measure of public attention to judicial activism, this snapshot is 
incomplete.60 The term “judicial activism” was allegedly coined only in 
January 1947.61 Yet as Judge Posner’s genealogy shows, the basic substantive 
debates about constitutional invalidation go back much further in time. The 
term “judicial activism” may have had precursors not captured in these n-gram 
searches. What the n-grams may be capturing are the arcs of popular verbal 
formulations within current debates about judicial behavior. To the extent these 
primitive inquiries demonstrate the rise of a particular cultural understanding of 
activism, they are consistent with the thesis that Thayer’s turn-of-the-century 
writing about judicial restraint had a lingering effect on broader debates. They 
also suggest that its disfavored sibling, judicial activism, did not appear in the 
public discourse with any frequency until more than a decade after its coining, 
around the end of the Warren Court in the 1960s. These data points do not 
prove that “the growing perception of the Court itself as a ‘political’ 
institution” was due to the “many politically divisive issues the Court has 
confronted since 1954.”62 Rather, the time lag between the beginning of the 
Warren Court and the public’s newfound focus on judicial activism suggests 
other forces beyond mere public observation of judicial behavior helped 
mobilize the public’s interest, support, and outrage. 
To summarize, available data about patterns of judicial activism across 
time are incomplete. My proposed supplements hardly complete the picture 
because they do not address the denominator question or supply a coding 
protocol for identifying what counts as the Court invalidating a law on 
constitutional grounds. Our understanding of judicial activism’s historical path 
is, therefore, in need of much more extensive reconstruction. Nonetheless, both 
the standard sources of data and the two additional perspectives I have explored 
here suggest that the Warren Court may be less of a watershed of judicial 
behavior than generally believed. Instead, the Warren Court may rather be a 
turning point for the public’s perceptions of that behavior, rather than judicial 
behavior itself. Those seeking to unlock the reasons why judicial activism arose 
would do better to begin their examination in the 1860s and 1870s. It is to those 
possibilities that I now turn. 
Books, 331 SCIENCE 176, 176 (2011).  
59. Id.  
60. For data from newspapers that run from 1986 to 2005, see LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 
15, at 11–12. 
61. The term is attributed to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., from a Fortune magazine piece. Craig 
Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1200 (2009). 
62. Geoffrey Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 
443–44. The first time the phrase “judicial activism” was used in a judicial opinion appears to be in 
Theriot v. Mercer, 262 F.2d 754, 760 n.5 (5th Cir. 1959).  
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II. 
RECASTING THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
What implications does our fragile contemporary knowledge about 
activism’s history have for Judge Posner’s argument? To rely on that data today 
is to make oneself hostage to tomorrow’s scholarly insights, so I will do so very 
cautiously. I focus on one common hypothesis that can be supported with data 
from three of the approaches to judicial activism’s history discussed above: 
judicial activism began in the post-Civil War and Reconstruction period, rather 
than during the heyday of the Warren Court. 
A. The Warren Court  
Judge Posner identifies the “exuberant” Warren Court as a turning point in 
the historical ascension of judicial activism and also as the beginning of a 
ratchet effect on judicial incentives to engage in some freewheeling kind of 
activism.63 This is a familiar trope in the academy. The Warren Court has long 
been alternately celebrated or trashed for its criminal procedure and equality 
rulings.64 
At first blush, both the LOC and the Clark-Whittington data seem to 
confirm Posner’s assertion that the Warren Court inaugurated today’s judicial 
activism. The rate of judicial invalidations by the Supreme Court was indeed on 
the decline around World War II, surely reflecting the Justices’ abandonment of 
economic due process. Only in the late 1950s did the rate of judicial 
invalidations start to manifest. 
But from another perspective, the Warren Court represents a return to a 
judicial form familiar since the Civil War’s wake. The LOC, Clark-
Whittington, and Samaha data all point toward a period after the Civil War and 
during Reconstruction as a pivotal moment in patterns of judicial behavior. The 
trend line of raw judicial invalidations, roughly flat since the beginning of the 
Republic, changes direction at this time. It assumes an upward gradient that 
continues, with some interruptions, almost up to the present day. As noted in 
Part I, this postbellum change in judicial behavior also coincides with shifts 
identified by Graber and Gillman in the rhetoric of judicial decisions and the 
institutional infrastructure of the federal courts.65 Hence, one could draw a 
trend line straight back through the Warren Court and the Lochner-era 
precedent to reach the first inklings of activism at the close of the Civil War. 
On this view, what calls for explanation is less the Warren Court as an 
innovator, and more the gap between the antebellum Court of the 1850s and the 
postbellum Court of the 1860s and 1870s.66 From this second perspective, 
63. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 546. 
64. LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 15, at 3–5.  
65. See supra text accompanying notes 32 to 35. 
66. It is also worth asking how the later transitions from one temporarily popular sort of judicial 
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Judge Posner might be right to talk of a “rise and fall,” but might do well to 
redraw the temporal scope of the claim. One might also wish to speak not of a 
unipeaked rise of judicial activism, but rather to view the history of judicial 
activism as a sequence of epicycles within a larger historical movement, with 
relatively aggressive and restrained moments alternating over time. Within the 
decline of judicial self-restraint, that is, it may be possible to chart tidal ebbs 
and flows in judicial behavior. 
If it is indeed the 1860s and 1870s—not the 1950s—that are the most 
important pivot in judicial activism, we must reexamine Posner’s claim that the 
post-Warren conservative Justices were forced to adopt an activist stance 
because they “were not about to embrace the ratchet theory of judicial 
restraint.”67 The “ratchet” theory that Posner is intuiting here rests on the claim 
that once one political coalition has stacked the courts with its allies, turning 
the federal judiciary to its transient programmatic and policy ends, there is no 
incentive for opposing political coalitions to disarm unilaterally by refraining 
from the same strategy when they are elected into national office. If it has 
force, this ratchet theory should not be limited to explanations of the 
efflorescence of conservative judicial activism in the 1970s and 1980s. It may 
also cast light on the Warren Court’s exploitation of footnote four of Carolene 
Products68 as a warrant for robust activism on behalf of socially vulnerable and 
politically marginalized minorities. That is, in making judicial appointments, 
the political coalitions responsible for creating the Warren Court were also 
responding to an empty space for judicial activism left by the defeat of the 
conservative Lochner Court.69 And the ratchet theory can be extended back 
even further to the Lochner era itself.70 Perhaps, that is, the rise of economic 
due process itself can be explained as a response to earlier forms of judicial 
activism. On this account, judicial activism was hardwired into the American 
constitutional system long before Earl Warren came to the Court, and the 
ratcheting up of activism cannot be laid at the doors of the 1950s and 1960s 
activism (e.g., economic due process) to another (e.g., due process) were accomplished. For example, a 
focus upon the Warren Court alone might elide the important political work done by Roosevelt’s 
Justice Department previously both in pressing Reconstruction-era statutes and in screening judicial 
nominees for their views on race. See KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 138, 
150–75 (2004). In this context, the Warren Court is even less countermajoritarian, and even more a 
conscious product of national political actors’ calculated expenditures, than is generally thought. 
Further, this project began long before Warren himself joined the Court.  
67. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 547. 
68. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also KECK, supra 
note 10, at 29 (arguing for the historical significance of footnote four). 
69. See KECK, supra note 10, at 93 (“[W]hile the [Warren Court] justices were motivated in 
part by jurisprudential concerns, they were also seeking to promote the political values of the New 
Deal/Great Society coalition, of which they themselves were enthusiastic members.”).  
70. See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 85 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 435 
(2005) (“The Taft, Harding, and Coolidge administrations fought to staff the federal judiciary with 
political actors prone to construe ambiguous Constitutional and statutory language against labor.”).  
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Court.71 Further, if judicial activism does have deeper roots in American 
history, it follows that the Warren Court was less of a countermajoritarian 
trailblazer than commonly believed.72 Rather, an older iteration of the Supreme 
Court whose political salience has dimmed into obscurity is really the crucible 
in which judicial activism was birthed. 
B. The Postbellum Period 
So it may be that the true inception of judicial activism was at the end of 
the Civil War, not the opening of the Civil Rights era. But with fleeting 
exceptions, this moment in American history has not been identified as seminal 
for the phenomenon of judicial review.73 Some attention to the case law of the 
time, however, may cast new light on how judicial activism first got off the 
ground. 
As an initial matter, the postbellum period is often thought of as a time at 
which the Court found itself at odds with a national political coalition through 
its close superintendence of Reconstruction law enforcement, paper money 
laws, and civil rights measures.74 One result of this confrontation, as Lucas 
Powe has observed, was eleven postbellum invalidations of federal statutes in a 
period of less than two decades—a stark contrast with a far lower invalidation 
rate before the war.75 Attention to the pattern of federal law invalidations 
indeed suggests that the postbellum Court was at best indifferent to the goals of 
Reconstruction. The postwar Court invalidated both pro-Reconstruction civil 
rights efforts and legislation enacted to address President Andrew Johnson’s 
71. Cf. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the 
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 586 
(2005) (hereinafter Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”) (arguing that the Marshall Court 
“won the approval of national officials by imposing their shared constitutional agenda on recalcitrant 
state actors who hamper[ed] national political goals”).  
72. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren 
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004); Whittington, 
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand,” supra note 71, at 587. 
73. One exception is a penetrating article by Howard Gillman, which observes in passing that 
the Court “began after the Civil War to strike down laws with greater regularity and to involve itself in 
more significant national policy disputes.” Gillman, supra note 34, at 512 (citations omitted). 
74. Recall that the Court’s threat to invalidate military reconstruction under the rule of Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), was serious enough to prompt Congress to cut off Supreme 
Court jurisdiction. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The Court briefly invalidated 
the use of paper money necessitated by war debts. Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 
SUP. CT. REV. 367. It then freed the perpetrators of the Colfax Massacre. United States v. Cruikshank, 
92 U.S. 542 (1876). And the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which to be sure had been already stripped of 
prescriptive components, denounced in the press, and sidelined by President Grant, received a frosty 
welcome. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Recent scholarship, however, argues that the 
Civil Rights Cases, in particular, had much less impact on federal enforcement authority than is 
commonly believed. See Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the 
“State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 347 (2007) (arguing that “state 
action doctrine was not a definitive or wholesale abandonment of blacks to their former masters”). 
75. POWE, supra note 9, at 144. 
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use of the pardon power to draw back in former Confederate supporters.76 So 
one inference from this pattern of invalidations is that the post-Civil War era 
was characterized in part by a conflict between a fragment of an antebellum 
ancien régime clinging onto power in the Supreme Court (where the Radical 
Republicans never appointed a majority of the Justices), and the Reconstruction 
Congress itself during a brief window of vigorous legislative action in favor of 
Southern blacks.77 Slow turnover on the Court, impeded by the tempestuous 
relationship between President Johnson and the Congress, meant that 
wholehearted judicial laboring on behalf of Reconstruction aims was never 
likely in the first place.78 At best, Michael Les Benedict has argued, the Court 
instead remained bound to an ideology of “State-centered nationalism” that 
constrained its willingness to act vigorously in favor of racial equality.79 
Patterns of judicial action respecting federal laws, however, are only part 
of the story about judicial activism in this era. The LOC data contain eleven 
cases between 1860 and 1879 in which federal laws were invalidated, and 
forty-nine cases in which state enactments were invalidated. The larger part of 
the story of judicial activism in the postbellum era thus concerns the judicial 
treatment of state statutes. But this part of the historical story is poorly 
understood. Historical attention to the era has tended to focus on the Civil War 
as a freestanding “constitutional crisis,” rather than examining the shifting 
pattern of judicial behavior in the pre- and postbellum eras.80 The habitual 
periodization in the era’s historiography, for instance in the Holmes Devise, 
also conduces to inattention about the transitional nature of the Civil War and 
the rupture between the ante- and postbellum Courts.81 And much of the 
76. For examples of civil rights remedies being curtailed, see United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 
629 (1883) (declaring federal penalization of certain crimes unconstitutional), and United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (upholding discriminatory voting practices). For the pardon cases, see, for 
example, United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 333 (1867). The conflict should not be overstated. At the same time that the Congress was 
coming into conflict with the Court in these cases, it was also expanding federal court jurisdiction to 
effectuate federal policies in the South. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP 
IN U.S. HISTORY 114–15 (2007). 
77. Interestingly, Stephen Skowronek’s history of presidential politics as a series of conflicts 
between shifting regimes identifies the Johnson presidency as one of particularly sharp conflict, 
wherein the President “provoked major constitutional crises over the legitimate exercise of presidential 
power.” STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS 
TO BILL CLINTON 44, 450–51 (1997). 
78. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 76, at 212–13. 
79. Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 39, 56. Les Benedict’s argument aims to explain the narrow holding of the Slaughter-
House Cases, and does not try to account for the observed rise in invalidations on other grounds. Id. at 
57–61. 
80. See Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 
327 (1964). I am grateful to Alison LaCroix for her insight into the historiography of the period.  
81. See Daniel W. Hamilton, Popular Constitutionalism in the Civil War: A Trial Run, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 953, 955 (2006) (criticizing the Holmes Devise on this point). 
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literature on the postbellum period has (albeit for good reason) focused on the 
fate of federal projects such as Reconstruction.82 The question of why so many 
more state statutes were invalidated after the war has not been so carefully 
examined. 
Different hypotheses might explain the changing judicial treatment of 
state laws in the postbellum period. An obvious threshold hypothesis would be 
that the Reconstruction Amendments provided the courts with a textual 
invitation to impose new kinds of constraints upon the states, one that courts 
eagerly took up. This interpretation may seem at first to be consistent with the 
Samaha data. But other data suggest it is unlikely to carry much weight. 
Consider for a moment some details of the changing pattern of state law 
invalidations after the Civil War. The first postwar invalidation of a state law 
on the basis of one of the Reconstruction Amendments is Strauder v. West 
Virginia83 in 1880. Between the end of the war and the ratification of the first 
Reconstruction Amendment in December 1865 and Strauder’s being handed 
down in 1880, the LOC data show forty-four other state laws being invalidated 
on the basis of a conflict with a provision of the antebellum Constitution. After 
Strauder, a decade passes before another law was invalidated on 
Reconstruction Amendment grounds—this time on a theory of economic due 
process.84 In the intervening decade, thirty-three other opinions were issued in 
which the Court invalidated state laws without citing the Reconstruction 
Amendments. That is, judicial behavior may have changed after the Civil War, 
but this change cannot be attributed to the Reconstruction Amendments. 
Indeed, since most Southern states were under the thumb of Reconstruction 
administrations through some point in the 1870s, an absence of state laws’ 
being invalidated on such grounds is hardly surprising.85 
If not due to the novelty of the Reconstruction Amendments, then what 
explains the new enforcement of the antebellum Constitution against the states? 
In the space of a brief essay, I can only offer a tentative hypothesis in response 
to this question. To this end, an examination of the forty-nine Supreme Court 
cases identified by the LOC between 1860 and 1879 in which a state statute 
was invalidated provides a launching point. A majority of those cases involve 
either interstate commerce or banking. Ten of the cases involved a railroad 
company as a litigant, while nine others involved a shipping company and still 
82. For a recent example, see Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1801 (2010) (arguing that Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence contradicts the text and history of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and exhorting Congress to more aggressively 
invoke powers under those Amendments). 
83. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
84. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
85. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 
at 346–459 (2002). 
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another nine involved banks. That is, what lies beneath this first wave of 
judicial activism is the rising tide of industrialization.86 
In this light, the changing pattern of postbellum judicial behavior might be 
explained as the product of an interaction between two forces. First, economic 
historians have emphasized the way in which not only transportation companies 
such as railroads, but also corporations that manufactured goods for new 
internal consumer markets, such as the sewing machine manufacturer I.M. 
Singer & Company, began expanding nationally through the 1860s and 1870s 
in ways that strained against “state trade barriers” and that aspired toward a 
national common market.87 Second, these corporations made their demands for 
expanded markets not only directly before the federal courts but also in the 
political sphere. Historians such as Howard Gillman have argued that the 
postbellum Republican Party was increasingly sympathetic to the plight of 
nascent national industries, and consequently made increased efforts to rework 
the federal judicial power through appointments and jurisdictional changes so 
the bench could “play an important role in promoting a policy of economic 
nationalism.”88 Following the lead of earlier historians, Gillman has also 
emphasized the catalytic role of statutory changes to federal court jurisdiction 
in 1875, which opened those courts to a newly emerging class of national 
corporations.89 Even prior to that, a wave of Republican appointments also 
began reworking the rules for ascertaining the diversity of corporate litigation 
“to allow corporations to sue and be sued more easily in national courts.”90 
The net result of these forces was that I.M. Singer and the other corporate 
players with national ambitions could press their claims against state laws in 
federal courts91 before judges “deeply influenced by the interests and 
ideologies that emerged during postbellum industrialization”92 and who were 
86. For a recent survey of the historical period emphasizing changing economic trends, see 
generally H.W. BRANDS, AMERICAN COLOSSUS: THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 1865–
1900 (2011). 
87. Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large 
Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 637 (1978); see also TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS 
OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, at xix, 102–03 (1979) 
(“Throughout the years following the Civil War, corporations doing interstate business faced the 
unhappy consequences of state law that frequently lacked uniformity and was often discriminatory.”). 
Why the I.M. Singer Company? Sewing machines are complex objects; they are best sold not by 
franchisees but through a nationwide sales force.  
88. See Gillman, supra note 34, at 516. 
89. Id. at 516–17; accord William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 
1863–1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 333–34 (1969) (enumerating postbellum changes to federal 
jurisdiction and explaining their significance). 
90. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 17 (1992). 
91. McCurdy, supra note 87, at 640–42; accord PURCELL, supra note 90, at 20 (noting the 
“growing corporate preference for the national courts [between] 1855 and 1885”). 
92. Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern Supreme Court to the Historical Evolution of 
American Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
INTERPRETATIONS 235, 237 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999). 
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also willing to “ameliorate the uncertainties created by the diffuse pattern of 
state incorporation laws.”93 This convergence of political and economic forces 
thus may have conduced to a postwar uptick in invalidations. Judicial activism 
in its original state, in other words, may well be best read to be a side effect of 
economic nationalization. Rather than responding to regional outlying 
preferences over racial politics as the Warren Court did, judicial activism in its 
formative days was committed to economic libertarian ends—the construction 
and deepening of the emergent American common market. 
Finally, there is an alternative, but not mutually exclusive, potential 
explanation for the postbellum change in judicial behavior that focuses on a 
different kind of learning by the federal bench. This argument would focus on 
the lesson that Dred Scott taught the federal bench. The aftermath of that case 
suggested that the federal courts could make dramatic inroads into the 
disposition of important national issues, and, even if the results thereof were 
morally or politically catastrophic, could survive with relatively scant long-
term damage. Dred Scott thereby fostered awareness amongst federal judges of 
the bench’s potential long-term stability and institutional durability. This in 
turn had a moral hazard effect. It made it cheaper for the Court to dabble in 
activism because the Justices knew that negative reputational consequences 
would evaporate with time. When called upon by national commercial interests 
and the reconfigured postwar Republican Party, federal judges were thus 
primed for action. 
C. Public Discussion of Judicial Activism 
The seminal role of the postbellum period in nurturing the judicial 
activism we know today raises a further, separate question: Why does the 
Warren Court loom so large in the current legal imagination? Judge Posner is 
not an outlier in finding significance in that more recent period. Indeed, it is 
now almost canonical to regard the Warren Court as a transition point in 
patterns of judicial behavior. 
In answering this question, the shifting public usages of “judicial 
activism” may be relevant. The n-grams reproduced in Figure 3 suggest that the 
Warren Court did indeed mark a change—not in the way judges decided cases, 
but in the way the public discussed judicial behavior. Perhaps the speed and 
compression of legal change during the Warren era is salient here.94 It is also 
plausible that the Warren Court’s importance lies in how it provided a 
generation of post-Goldwater politicians with a new platform to mobilize latent 
constituencies in a reconfigured and more ideologically homogeneous national 
party system.95 Under this theory, the Warren Court midwifed a new political 
93. FREYER, supra note 87, at 110. 
94. See Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 548. 
95. For one account of the effect of this political change on the law, see generally JONATHAN 
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argument about “judicial activism,” an argument that still captivates thinking 
about the federal judicial role even if that role did not change demonstrably 
during the Warren years.96 Perhaps this theory also captures the imagination of 
a public that increasingly views politicians as elite and antidemocratic, with 
notionally countermajoritarian courts serving as exemplars of a perceived 
democracy deficit. That view has stuck, notwithstanding dramatic changes in 
the Court’s composition. The Warren Court, in short, matters less for what it 
was and more for how it distilled democratic resentment against perceived 
judicial and political elites. 
Public anger at legal elites may have also captured the attention of a 
generation of legal scholars and judges who came of intellectual age with 
Justice Warren as an exemplar, whether positive or negative, of what a judge 
might be.97 As a result, the Warren Court precipitated a wave of “constitutional 
theory” aimed at supplying “right” answers to difficult constitutional 
questions.98 This suggests—albeit without proving—that the rise of 
constitutional theory as a discipline is, while not necessarily causally related to 
judicial activism in the courts, still just a side effect of public and political 
debate about judicial activism. 
Constitutional theory may have a separate connection to claims about 
judicial activism. To accuse a judge of judicial activism implies a benchmark of 
acceptable judicial behavior. To make that label into a pejorative accusation 
requires some sort of normative theory of constitutional review. Participants in 
that public debate need to be credentialed to expound on the “right” 
constitutional result. If that is so, theories of constitutional interpretation such 
as originalism may not matter only because they directly influence or correlate 
with outcomes in constitutional cases (if indeed they do matter to the outcomes 
of particular controversies).99 They may matter instead because they help 
construct and channel diffuse public judgments about when judicial action is 
warranted. In other words, constitutional theory supplies the normative 
benchmarks implicit in manifestly political claims about the appropriateness of 
judicial behavior. While the direct influence of individual scholars is often hard 
to discern, collectively scholars may thereby provide a significant resource for 
political argumentation. Like Tin Pan Alley songsmiths, legal scholars churn 
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).  
96. See, e.g., FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE 
OF THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE (1999). 
97. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
at v (1980). 
98. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 546 (dating “rising intellectual ambition of legal 
academics” to roughly the 1960s). 
99. As Judge Posner has observed, no such correlation exists. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK, supra note 4, at 366 (“My impression is that politically like-minded judges usually vote the 
same way despite their different judicial philosophies.”). 
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out a frothing tumult of ideas in the hope that one catches.100 Individually 
irrelevant, collectively they generate the volume and diversity of scholarly 
production to feed public debate about the Court. The social value of a piece of 
constitutional theory is therefore its option value as political rhetoric. 
If then “the Roberts Court . . . bids fair to exemplify conservative 
activism” in full flower,101 this is surely a credit to conscious and durable 
intellectual investments in both the academy and the government. Those 
investments lent “cultural capital to be taken seriously in fields with deeply 
embedded expectations of participants’ experience, knowledge, and cultural 
competence.”102 They supplied intellectual oxygen to a generation of lawyers 
and judges to render not merely plausible, but inevitable, forms of judicial 
activism that would have been unthinkable mere years beforehand.103 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Posner’s Essay on judicial activism and self-restraint raises many 
important points. Equally worthy of note is the manner in which it tees up 
novel and consequential questions about the historical trajectory of judicial 
behavior. Currently available data provide surprisingly thin responses. Far 
more work—both empirical and theoretical—seems to be warranted. In the 
interim, however, cautious speculation on the appropriate period for close 
historical scrutiny seems not just plausible but proper given the continued 
muddied public debate about the role of constitutional review in a democratic 
polity. Such speculation suggests that the Warren Court did not play the 
seminal role in changing the norms of judicial behavior that conventional 
wisdom has suggested. Instead, it points to an earlier period of centripetal 
nationalism after the Civil War as the truly transformative moment in the 
American story of judicial activism and self-restraint. 
100. Publishing houses would purchase a handful of songs, and then lobby media, for example, 
with payola, to secure airplay. NICHOLAS E. TAWA, THE WAY TO TIN PAN ALLEY: AMERICAN 
POPULAR SONG, 1866–1910, at 43 (1990).  
101. Posner, Rise and Fall, supra note 2, at 551. 
102. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 19 (2008). In charting the rise of the conservative legal movement that has 
its current acme in one branch of the Roberts Court, Teles underscores the pivotal role of intellectual 
investments. Id. at 73, 83, 163–67.  
103. Consider the trajectory from Judge Bork’s 1989 rejection of an individual Second 
Amendment right, to Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
Compare Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at B5 
(documenting Bork’s position), with Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 222–25 (2008) (discussing Heller). As Judge 
Posner points out, it is superficially mystifying why Justice Stevens, whom Posner describes as 
possessing “no discernible judicial philosophy, but leaning toward pragmatism,” POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 346, would play on originalism turf, see Posner, Rise and Fall, supra 
note 2, at 549. But the ability of originalism to command the field of argument, even when a 
pragmatist is playing, is merely the return from the intellectual investments described by Teles in that 
constitutional methodology.  
       
606 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:579 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments may address them to: 
 
Professor Aziz Z. Huq 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL 60637 
 huq@uchicago.edu 
The University of Chicago Law School 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series 
 
For a listing of papers 1–350 please go to http://www.law.uchicago.edu/publications/papers/publiclaw.  
 
351. Brian Leiter, The Circumstances of Civility, May 2011 
352. Brian Leiter, Naturalized Jurisprucence and American Legal Realism Revisited, May 
2011 
353. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, June 2011 
354. Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met 
Challenges for Law and Economics, June 2011  
355. Bernard E. Harcourt, Radical Throught from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, through 
Foucault, to the Present: Comments on Steven Lukes’ “In Defense of False 
Consciousness,” June 2011 
356. Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to 
Gordon Wood, July 2011 
357. Martha C. Nussbaum, Teaching Patriotism: Love and Critical Reform, July 2011 
358. Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, August 2011 
359. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, August, 2011 
360. Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, September 2011 
361. José Antonio Cheibub, Zahcary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Latin American 
Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective, September 2011 
362. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law: Introduction, 
September 2011 
363. Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the United States after 9/11: Congress, the 
Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, September 2011 
364. Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, October 2011 
365. Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior and Anup Malani, Implicit Bias in Legal Interpretation, 
October 2011 
366. Scott A. Baker and Anup Malani, Does Accuracy Improve the Information Value of 
Trials? October 2011 
367. Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom, and Mark van der Laan, Improving the FDA Approval 
Process, October 2011 
368. Adam M. Samaha, Talk about Talking about Constitutional Law, October 2011 
369. Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’s Mobilizing for Human 
Rights, November 2011 
370. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Political Risk and Sovereign Debt 
Contracts, November 2011 
371. Lee Fennell, Lumpy Property, January 2012 
372. Jonathan Jackson, Aziz Huq, Ben Bradford and Tom R. Tyler, Going Outside the Law: 
The Role of the State in Shaping Attitudes to Private Acts of Violence, January 2012 
373. Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First 
Amendment, January 2012 
374. Aziz S. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, January 2012 
375. Ariel Porat and Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, January 2012 
376. Bernard E.Harcourt, On the American Paradox of Laissez Faire and Mass Incarceration, 
March, 2012 
377. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Politics of Incivility, March 2012 
378. Bernard E. Harcourt, Fantasies and Illusions: On Liberty, Order, and Free Markets, 
March 2012 
379. Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Asymmetries and Incentives in Evidence Production, 
March 2012 
380. Aziz Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, March 2012 
381. Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, April 2012 
382. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the 
Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st Century Financial Markets, April 2012 
383. David Fagundes and Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, April 2012 
384. Rosalind Dixon and Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a Capabilities 
Approach: The Question of Special Priority, May 2012 
385. Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the 
Changing Face of Free Speech, May 2012 
386. Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A Critique, May 2012 
387. Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Concent in Commercial 
and Other Law, June 2012 
388. Tom Ginsburg, Courts and New Democracies: Recent Works, June 2012 
389. Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional 
Design, June 2012 
390. Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, July 2012 
391. Daniel Abebe, Rethinking the Costs of International Delegations, July 2012 
392. Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, July 2012 
393. Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint, July 2012 
